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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to observe the causal mechanism between meritocratic recruitment 
and level of corruption. Previous cross country analyses showed positive results, however 
what is lacking in academic literature is micro-analyses that would capture the positive and 
negative ways of causal mechanism which will be an added value to the academic literature.  
The current research does not aim to build the hypothesis but rather complements the 
research on meritocracy by looking at a single case study, taking Tajikistan, a country in 
Central Asia. The paper identifies and analyses relative difference in implementation of the 
public administration reform and perception of sample agencies, Ministry of Education and 
Ministry of Finance pertaining to meritocracy and corruption.  
The empirical analysis is based on twenty one interviews with persons responsible for reform 
making and reform implementation. To validate the answers a group of independent 
observers is included. The findings of the empirical analysis show that meritocratic 
recruitment does not have an effect on the level of corruption at its earliest endorsement in a 
transit country such as Tajikistan. It is formally endorsed within the new public 
administration system, but instead a majority of civil servants are hired and promoted on the 
basis of patronage and all types of contacts. 
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-3- 
 
 
Acknowledgment 
This research would not have been possible without a continuous support and guidance of 
those who contributed and provided their valuable assistance and inputs in the design, 
preparation and finalisation of this work.  
Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Carl Dahlström, Thesis Advisor for 
his non-stop support and patience, inspiring insights and valuable comments, motivation and 
encouragement who guided me throughout the process of writing.    
Further, I would like to extend my gratitude to all research interviewers for their valuable 
inputs in the research development.   
Also, my warm thanks to Marcia Grimes and Maria Lilleste for being supportive and kind. 
Finally, my biggest thanks to my family and friends for their extensive support and patience; 
for giving their valuable feedbacks and providing relevant materials.  I would not be able to 
get this work done. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4- 
 
Abbreviations 
ACA - Anti-Corruption Agency 
ADB – Asian Development Bank 
CSS – Centre for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan 
DSDEC - Division of State Directorate for Education Control 
HR – Human Resources 
EU – European Union 
ICRG – International Crisis Risk Group  
MoE – Ministry of Education 
MoF – Ministry of Finance  
OECD- Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PA – Public Administration 
PAR - Public Administration Reform 
PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  
RT – Republic of Tajikistan 
TI – Transparency International  
TJS – Tajik Somoni (local currency) 
ToR – Terms of Reference 
WB – World Bank 
WGI – World Governance Indicators  
 
-5- 
 
Table of Contents 
1. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................ 7 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .................................................................................. 10 
2.1 Defining Corruption and Impartiality .......................................................................... 10 
2.2 Bureaucratic Features and Impartial Mindset. Is it achievable? ............................... 13 
2.3 What bureaucratic mechanisms to study ...................................................................... 18 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN: AIM, METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS ............... 20 
3.1 Aim of the Research ........................................................................................................ 20 
3.2 Brief Overview of the Sample Agencies ........................................................................ 22 
3.3 Research Methodology. Field Work Process ................................................................ 24 
3.4 Research Limitation ........................................................................................................ 27 
4. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDY ............................................................... 28 
4.1 Case Selection .................................................................................................................. 28 
5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS .............................................................................................. 32 
5.1 Civil Service System – Before and After. Are There Any Significant Changes for 
Real? ....................................................................................................................................... 32 
5.2 Reforming Civil Service System..................................................................................... 37 
5.2.1 Recruitment Process ................................................................................................. 37 
5.2.2 Career Development ................................................................................................. 40 
5.2.3 Analysis of Causal Mechanism: Merits and Meritocracy ..................................... 41 
5.3 Salary, Incentives and Pay.............................................................................................. 43 
5.3.1 Analysis of the Causal Mechanism: Salary ............................................................ 44 
5.4 Checks and Balances ....................................................................................................... 45 
5.4.1 Analysis of Causal Mechanism: Checks and Balances ......................................... 46 
6. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 48 
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................... 50 
 
-6- 
 
 
TABLES  
 
Table 1. Bureaucratic Features and its Mechanisms ..................................................... 18 
Table 2. Corruption Perception Ranking ...................................................................... 30 
Table 3. Comparison of Recruitment Approaches ......................................................... 34 
 
 
FIGURES 
Figure 1. Corruption Trend ........................................................................................... 29 
 
 
LIST OF APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1. Map of Tajikistan ............................................................................................ 56 
Appendix 2. Sample of Questions ........................................................................................ 57 
 
SCHEMES  
Scheme 1 .................................................................................................................................. 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-7- 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Corruption is a universal multi-faceted social phenomenon affecting institutional quality, 
hindering socio-economic growth and undermining political stability and human 
development in a society. Corruption cannot be identified as a single and independent 
phenomenon but rather it is a combination of the human behaviour and other variables, some 
of which is difficult to recognise (Almas, 2000:5). Hence, how can the term “corruption” be 
defined? There is plethora of opinion which is mainly associated with illegal activities to 
pursue and increase the benefits for self-interest. However the most quoted and prominent 
definition is given by Gray and Kauffman (1998) that describes corruption as “the abuse or 
misuse of public service for private gain”. The question then is - why do the officials misuse 
the public services for their own interest? There are various views among scholars with 
regard to factors that provoke the causation of corruption. This is primarily because it is seen 
from the perspective of an individual’s background and surrounding environment as a whole. 
For example, some refer to the lack of social norms (e.g., Public Opinion Survey by CSS & 
UNDP, 2006)  and trust (e.g.,Rothstein, 2007), others point to the long established historical 
and cultural traditions (e.g.,Bardhan, 1997; de Sardan, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Hasty, 
2005), while the rest believe that it is because of weak bureaucratic and dysfunctional 
political institution (e.g. Treisman, 2000; Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Persson, Tabellini & 
Trebbi, 2003; Andrews & Montinola, 2004; Keefer, 2007).  
Indeed, all above-mentioned factors favour the increase of corruption. Treisman (2000) 
opines that very little is known about what causes corruption to be higher in one place than in 
another. While answering this question, Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell (2009:1) refer to 
the extensive literature both on the political and bureaucratic sides i.e. effect of democracy, 
electoral systems, incentive mechanisms for those who take the bureaucratic and policy 
decisions etc.  Having this opinion as a ground the root of the causation can be considered is 
a lack of “impartial public institutions” with “impartial norms and principles” that would not 
act against the law and be unmoved by certain types of considerations while implementing 
policies and laws.  
 
The agents implementing those policies and laws are civil servants who are politically 
neutral, impartial and do not pursue their own self interest to retain power or benefits and act 
according to the code of ethics. Thus to be more specific and complement the existing 
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definition, corruption involves the violation of impartial principles by a holder of public 
office to achieve private gain (Kurer, 2005:230; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008).  
A follow-up question occurs if there is any causal relationship between impartiality and level 
of corruption? Despite very few attention given to the bureaucratic structures within cross-
country variations comparing other variables (for example, GDP, rule of law, human 
development etc), it has been argued that bureaucratic features are one of the ways to 
promote impartiality among civil servants that positively affect curbing corruption.  Previous 
cross-country empirical studies found a strong relationship between bureaucratic features and 
high quality of government. To name few, Evans and Rauch (1999, 2000) found a positive 
relationship between bureaucratic elements and economic growth arguing that these features 
in comparison to others would be most the efficient tools in facilitating economic growth. 
Henderson et al (2003) examined the relationship between state bureaucratic capacity and 
poverty reduction. Their findings revealed that countries with effective bureaucratic features 
might significantly reduce the level of poverty through effectiveness of services they provide 
and therefore would improve the level of quality of government. Finally, Dahlström, 
Lapuente and Teorell (2011) revealed that bureaucratic feature, such as meritocratic 
recruitment reduces the level of corruption even though other variables like type of regime 
are controlled. However, competitive salaries and long term career rewards do not have a 
significant impact on the level of corruption.  
To sum up, these cross country empirical analyses included both developed and developing 
countries and found positive relationship between bureaucratic features and high quality of 
government that is capable to reduce the level of corruption and sustain economic growth.  
However, what is lacking in the academic literature is cross national comparative empirical 
studies that would observe public and/or private agencies and capture challenges the agencies 
face in a country. Besides, previous research has not been able to observe the micro-
foundation of causal mechanism between bureaucratic features and the level of corruption.  
Therefore the current research does not aim to build the hypothesis but rather intends to 
complement this gap through looking at a single case study, taking Tajikistan, a country in 
the Central Asia, as the area of research. Besides the general goal, the paper will try to 
identify the factors that impede successful implementation of merit-based recruitment and 
(general) attitudes of civil servants on this issue. And finally the research will attempt to 
analyse relative difference in implementation of the public administration reform (PAR) and 
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perception of sample agencies pertaining to meritocracy and corruption.  The research builds 
upon a qualitative method relying on primary resources by interviewing a range of actors 
among public sector senior and mid-level employees, representatives of donor community 
and NGOs. It also relies on secondary resources by analysing, articles and extracts from local 
newspapers, reports etc. to get sufficient knowledge on this topic.   
Tajikistan is a developing country where low level of living standards, political preference 
and inherited post-soviet bureaucracy led to an increase of corruption in the country. 
According to the Transparency International ranking
1
, the country steadily stands in the 
bottom thirty for the last three years (2007-2010) positioned at 150 out of 180 countries 
worldwide.  A recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report concludes that “corruption 
remains at a breathtaking level” affecting every sector in the country (“Tajikistan: The 
Changing Insurgent Threats”, ICG report, 2011). Despite all odds, the government is 
committed to fight against corruption by endorsing and implementing a range of institutional 
reforms. Among them are the Public Administration Reform for 2005-2015 that aims to 
create a skilled, adequately paid and corruption free civil service capable to develop, 
implement and monitor government policies (Public Administration Reform Strategy of 
Tajikistan, 2006). As a part of this ongoing reform, some new features of bureaucratic 
mechanisms, such as meritocratic (or competitive) recruitment and performance related pay 
have been introduced.  Thus, this study represents an attempt to empirically and 
comparatively analyse the effectiveness of public administration reform and its impact on the 
level of corruption by looking at two public agencies – Ministry of Education and Ministry of 
Finance. These ministries were among the first public agencies where upon successful 
piloting of PAR components illustrated results and therefore these PAR components had been 
scaled up to other public agencies. Thus, the rationale behind opting these ministries is to 
demonstrate effects of the reform and identify the factors that may impede the effective 
implementation of the reform.   
 
The findings of the empirical analysis revealed that meritocratic recruitment does not have an 
effect on the level of corruption at its earliest endorsement in a transit country such as 
Tajikistan. It is formally endorsed within the new PAR system, but instead a majority of civil 
                                                          
1
 www.transperancy.org  
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servants are hired and promoted on the basis of patronage and all types of contacts. The 
priority is given to networking and contacts instead of competency and professionalism and 
unfortunately meritocracy is hardly rewarded in the public sector. Low salaries indeed serves 
as an inducement for corruption, and when the civil servants are paid inadequately, many 
considered it allowable for them to accept a bribe. Empirical findings and data from the Anti-
Corruption Agency showed that the Ministry of Education is more prone to corrupt behaviour 
compared to the Ministry of Finance. Whereas, the overabundance of specialists result in 
wide use of patronage and all types of contacts in the Ministry of Finance to select “the 
better” candidates. 
The thesis is structured as follows: first section will equip the audience with a theoretical 
framework and the contribution from previous research and studies which are relevant to the 
research question. Equipped enough with theoretical perspective on bureaucratic 
mechanisms, the section will explore the causation of corruption and theoretical connections 
between corruption and components of public administration. Research methodology, 
overview of the sample agencies and limitations of the research will be presented in the 
second section. This section will introduce the organisational structure of sample agencies - 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance, illustrating some features in common. 
Further, it will give a brief intro of Anti-Corruption Agency and Department for Civil Service 
profile, as these agencies have a direct impact on the competency and professionalism of civil 
servants and corruption (revealed) cases accordingly. The third section presents the case 
country, thus it builds the ground for corruption and public administration system in 
Tajikistan.  The fourth section approaches the main point of the thesis by introducing the case 
study and will observe the established theory by bringing and analysing the views of 
respondents. And finally, the last section concludes the paper by summarising main findings.   
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Defining Corruption and Impartiality  
This section will first touch upon the concept of corruption and try to identify its main cause. 
Based on previous cross-country studies, this section will look upon bureaucratic features and 
identify the mechanisms through which the corruption can be curbed.  
-11- 
 
Corruption is a multi-faceted social phenomenon comprising a mixture of expression of 
individual and social interests and a reflection of the functioning of shadow markets (CSS 
and UNDP, “Corruption in Tajikistan: Public Opinion, 2010:19). The boundaries of this 
phenomenon are not clear enough to identify how and whether it differs from clientelism, 
nepotism, patronage etc (Johnston, 2005 cited in Rothstein & Tegnhammar, 2006:4). 
Although there is no universal accepted definition as what corrupt behaviours constitutes, the 
most quoted and prominent definition is given by the World Bank and Transparency 
International that defines corruption as “the abuse or misuse of public service for private 
gain” (Gray & Kauffman, 1998).  
 
Rothstein (2007:6) argues that corruption is a phenomenon that seems to be sticky, or in other 
words “once the system gets there, it stays there”. In the academic literature there are plethora 
of opinion of its cause - some scholars argue that it is because of absence of (social) norms 
(e.g., Public Opinion Survey by CSS & UNDP, 2006) and lack of social trust in the society 
(e.g., Rothstein, 2007) while others point to the cultural dimension (e.g., Bardhan, 1997; de 
Sardan, 1999; Hasty, 2005; Rose-Ackerman, 1999) and the type of political regime and weak 
institutional capacity (e.g.,Andrews & Montinola, 2004; Keefer, 2007; Montinola & 
Jackman, 2002; Persson, Tabellini & Trebbi, 2003; Treisman, 2000). The lack of these 
components certainly results in capacity of the government institutions to effectively 
formulate and fight against corrupt behaviour.  
However, numerous prominent scholars believe that good governance apart of being a key 
instrument to foster economic growth is a cornerstone to curb corruption (e.g., Hall & Jones, 
1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002, 2004; Easterly & Levine, 2003; Rodrik, 
Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004). Rothstein and Teorell (2005, 2008) depart from “good 
governance” theory considering difficult to measure it and instead suggest using “quality of 
government” concept
2
.  In their paper they make a very crucial observation that the current 
paper will build its argument upon that. The essence of  quality of government as per authors’ 
is “impartiality
3
” without which it is hard to achieve the high level of quality of government 
                                                          
2
 Quality of Government is a broad concept; however Rothstein and Teorell (2005, 2008) quantify it into four measurable 
indicators that capture the performance in the public sector: rule of law, government accountability, bureaucratic 
effectiveness and corruption.  
3
 While speaking about impartiality, the paper sticks to the description given by Cupit (2000) identifying the concept as “to 
treat people equally irrespective by personal relationships, personal likes and dislikes and their social status. Rothstein and 
Teorell (2005:9) argue that impartiality is not the same as “being objective”, as the latter implies that an individual can have 
a full knowledge and understanding of a (policy) case and weigh all the pros and cons and can come up with the best 
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that would contribute to reducing income inequality and poverty, increasing human 
development and strengthening democratic institutions that in turn altogether have a positive 
effect in lowering the level of corruption. “Impartial public institutions” is defined as not to 
act against the law and be unmoved by certain types of considerations like treat people 
irrespective of personal relations and give special preferences while implementing policies 
and laws.  
Thus, having this in mind, the current paper supports the definition of corruption given by 
Kurer (2005:230) stating that “corruption involves a holder of public office violating the 
impartiality principle in order to achieve private gain”. Impartiality shall be a primary feature 
of the actions taken by street and professional bureaucrats, civil servants and politicians. 
While fulfilling their responsibilities, it is crucial to define what motives behind they pursue 
and distinguish the dimension of their interests. Whether a civil servant or a politician is 
working towards self-interest and maximising his/her profit and favouring any economic, 
ethnic
4
 interest for personal gain or, on the contrary, acting as an impartial body and not 
promoting any particular interest.  
Violation of impartiality principle as well as misuse of specific normative and behavioural 
criterion (may) result in evolving of “particularistic political culture” where the treatment of 
citizens depends on their position in the society and people do not expect to be treated fairly 
by the state (Rothstein, 2007:3). In other words, in a preferred political culture everything 
depends on the connections, ability to bribe and being a member of the clientelistic networks 
that goes completely against impartiality.  This can be referred during recruitment process in 
the public sector where particularistic political culture can be above merits and qualifications 
and things like money, political and family connections, ethnicity, and political party 
belongings, etc. play a central role for the decision made by the bureaucracy.  The previous 
studies and academic literature can serve as a platform to identify and find what 
[bureaucratic] mechanisms can promote impartiality and reduce level of corruption in the 
public sector? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
decision. While impartiality means that an individual/public official should be neither directly nor indirectly a part of a 
(policy) case.   
4
 “This action is considered to be irrelevant unless it is not stipulated in the law policy” by Rothstein and Teorell 
(2005,2008). 
 
-13- 
 
 2.2 Bureaucratic Features and Impartial Mindset. Is it achievable? 
The idea about impartial professional civil servant/bureaucrat is not new, where its 
fundamental concept is laid by Max Weber.  According to the concept,  a professional civil 
servant operating in the bureaucratic machinery is politically neutral, impartial, paid a decent 
salary, recruited and promoted on merit, and does not have property or business interests that 
conflict with the fair performance of its duties and acts according to the code of ethics 
(Adamolekum, 1993 cited in Ackerman, 1999:69).  
 
Wilson K. Graham gives a complete description of bureaucracy by noting that “it is the most 
rational and developed form of administration” without which the management of the modern 
state is unimaginable as it knows how the machinery of the government operates and how to 
make the system work (2008:4-10). Hollyer argues that a government is less likely to be able 
to implement the state policies on its own; it is obviously delegated to competent bureaucratic 
officials, who are capable to execute “government decisions into policy outcomes” (2009:2). 
By providing their expertise and information, their (bureaucrats) role is not only seen at the 
stage of implementation but also at formation stage, thus having an important effect on the 
political process (ibid, 2009:2).  Therefore, it is considered as one of the effective instruments 
in the management of the public sector.  
 
In the academic literature, bureaucracy is compared with democracy – the provider of 
governance for a society. On the other hand, it is associated with hierarchical or even 
authoritarian forms of governing where decisions are made about citizens (Etzioni-Halevey, 
1983 cited in Peters Guy, 2008). However, what makes bureaucracy high quality and 
impartial when it is autonomous and not pressured by the political preferences and indeed has 
set up clear mechanisms for bureaucratic features (e.g. recruitment, competitive salary, career 
rewards).  
 
Having this as a ground, previous studies found a strong relationship between “Weberian” 
public institutions and high quality of government that promotes impartial [code of] conduct.  
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Scheme 1 
Public Administration Reform àBureaucratic Features
5
à Impartial Civil Servants 
 
 
 
Corruption 
 
Among those, Evans and Rauch (1999,2000) were the pioneers to establish a relationship 
between [Weberian] bureaucratic features and economic growth by empirically testing some 
of its mechanisms such as, meritocratic recruitment, predictable long-term career rewards and 
competitive salary.   
 
They argued that these features in comparison to others would be the most efficient tools at 
facilitating economic growth. First, meritocracy ensures that a hired individual has a set of 
required competences to fulfil job requirements. Secondly, long-term career rewards 
encourages competent people to join and perform well and, finally competitive salary makes 
corrupt behaviour less attractive as the cost of being caught would be high. Their hypothesis 
was based on 35 semi-industrialised and poor countries that incorporated Weberian features 
in their bureaucratic structures and has experienced a rapid economic growth between 1970 -
1990 in comparison with countries which have less Weberian incorporation (e.g when 
grouping the countries by regions, the East Asian countries scored high compared to African 
group).   
 
The analysis of Evans and Rauch has promoted a large number of studies to use their dataset 
and justify further study on the relationship between bureaucratic features and variables, like 
poverty, growth and corruption.  Henderson et al (2003) built his theory upon Evans and 
Rauch (1999, 2000) study and examined the relationship between state bureaucratic capacity 
and poverty reduction. Using their dataset on income poverty, they found a strong 
relationship between “Weberian” public institutions and ability of countries to reduce 
poverty. Their findings revealed that the states with effective public bureaucracy may 
                                                          
5
 Bureaucratic features defined as 1) meritocratic recruitment, 2) long term career rewards and 3) competitive 
salary 
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significantly reduce level of poverty through effectiveness of services they provide and 
therefore improve level of quality of government. Meritocratic recruitment and competent 
public employee may enhance the effectiveness of public expenditures in public sector 
through effective planning, financing and implementing public sector related policy. While 
long career rewards promotes to raise level of competence and reduce the attractiveness in 
corrupt actions. Henderson et al conclude that “these services can directly reduce aspects of 
capability poverty (e.g. by making people literate and by improving ill health) and indirectly 
reduce income poverty, as educated and healthy people are more likely to be productive and 
to generate higher incomes” (2003:9).  
 
Though empirical results showed positive correlation between variables, some critical 
arguments exist in the academic literature pointing on the shortfalls of the results. They 
concern methodology, design, selected variables and empirical findings. 
Olsen (2005) in his critiques questions whether bureaucracy (with its features) is a panacea to 
curb corruption and response to challenges in public administration. He argues whether 
bureaucracy is a desirable form for competencies, staffing, resources, and outcomes of the 
public sector that could lead to the economic growth and thus lower the level of corruption. 
Formal [bureaucratic] organisation/institution is seen as a façade, and bureaucrats do not act 
in accordance with the institution’s codes of conduct that results in an unreliable and corrupt 
staff (ibid, 2005:5-6).  
Olsen (2005) makes a very good observation by identifying types of bureaucracy as 1) it is 
not bureaucratic enough and 2) it is extremely bureaucratic. This criticism in fact does not 
only question [professional] bureaucracy but impartiality of civil servants.  Acting as a semi-
or-extreme bureaucrat, one can suppose that “impartiality” concept is not fully clear to them 
(i.e. civil servants) therefore they are blamed for being not sensitive to issues that require a 
special consideration. Instead they apply a set of common rules to all cases they consider and 
make decisions that might be different from original intentions behind the policy. In that case 
they are accused of being ineffective bureaucratic machinery. Besides, pursuing self-interest 
and acting based on social and political belongings, gender and preferences can hardly make 
a bureaucrat as an impartial civil servant.  
Further, Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell (2011) touching upon methods and variables 
critically point at two issues. First, Evans and Rauch did not control the type of regime; 
-16- 
 
therefore the relationship between meritocratic recruitment and corruption would disappear if 
to include the nature of political system. Second is the question of selection bias; the number 
of countries has disproportionately been selected; out of 35 industrialized and developing 
countries only 5 poor countries that were “at critical state of economic development” 
represented that might have needed necessary bureaucratic characteristics. Finally the results 
should be replicated in other contexts as the bureaucratic structures might have been 
overestimated. Therefore, in their studies (2011) they departed from Evans and Rauch study 
but still looked at bureaucratic mechanisms such as recruitment and career patterns. Their 
empirical findings based on 520 experts from 52 countries revealed that meritocratic 
recruitment reduces level of corruption despite other variables, such as political regime, 
number of veto players, etc. are controlled. However, competitive salaries, long term career 
rewards and internal promotion do not have a significant impact on level of corruption.  
Swamy et al. (2001) and Treisman (2000) support this argument by revealing that the impact 
of wages on corruption is very insignificant in their respective studies. Lambsdorff (2005) 
opines that increase of wages would be a costly approach and lost to fight corruption, if a 
public servant is caught and fired (2005:19). Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) in a sample 
of 31 developing countries found a negative influence of civil service wages on the level of 
corruption, by arguing that low wages is the inducement for public servants to complement 
their income via acting impartially. The authors further opine that corrupt governments tend 
to have a poor budgetary performance or might consider that civil servants make enough 
profits from corrupt behaviour, and as a result reduce civil service salary.   
The issue of high wages is however, debatable, as some previous studies
6
 (e.g. La Porta, 
Rafael et al, 1999 and Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974) at the same time found a 
positive relationship between public sector wages and corruption.  This bureaucratic feature 
[competitive salary] is very crucial especially for countries in transit where the simultaneous 
process of developing market economy, designing new political and social institutions creates 
the ground for corruption and therefore the bureaucrats/civil servants experience less 
impartiality. Pay reform and incentive systems can be one of the ways to reduce corrupt 
behaviour otherwise corruption will be a survival strategy among bureaucrats/civil servants.  
                                                          
6
 They measure the relationship between public sector wages and corruption.  
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Ackerman (1999) believes that low pay in the public sector has several drawbacks. First, the 
officials are most likely to take a second/or supplementary job or accept payoffs. Secondly, 
they may operate their business by misusing their government positions. Third, some 
qualified staff may seek the job in the private sector or leave abroad, leaving the less 
qualified behind, and causing brain drain to some extent. Because of that, “labor market 
equilibrium” may arise with low skilled specialists in low paid government jobs they are 
unqualified to perform (ibid: 73). At the end, the civil service will be disproportionately 
staffed with two kinds of workers: low-productivity workers who are not employed in 
“comparable” jobs and those, who are willing to take bribes (Besley & Mclaren, 1993 cited in 
Ackerman, 1999:74). Though, it does not mean that high salary is the best way to incentivise 
public employees and a magic bullet to deter the level of corruption. In order to make it work, 
indeed, degree of meritocracy and probably some kind of internal auditing of checks and 
balance mechanisms are to be established.  
Another important element that is worth mentioning is the principal (or ruler/ manager)-
agent (or professional/street bureaucrat) relationship and their accountability. It is mostly 
argued that the high level of corruption can be expected from the agents, even though they 
are selected on the basis of professional qualifications (Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell, 
2011). It is primarily assumed that a principal always take the role of controlling corruption 
(Klitgaard, 1988; Galtung & Pope, 1999; Rauch & Evans, 2000; Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001; 
Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006 cited in Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2010). In other words, a 
principal cannot observe whether a law or policy is implemented honestly or impartially by 
an agent as s/he does not possess all the information that an agent may have (Persson, 
Rothstein and Teorell, 2010). This might be true; however there is other side of the theory, 
which probably is less tested empirically. It can be possible that a principal may behave 
opportunistically, acts in his/her own interest and is free to choose the agents. Thus a network 
of people who share the same values and principles can be established, where they can 
coordinate their [corrupt] actions.  And when it comes to the issue of accountability, the agent 
is yet accountable to the principle, as a principal monitors the behaviour of the bureaucratic 
agent and applies either incentives (e.g. performance based pay) or sanctions (in case if any 
corrupt activities are revealed) to improve agent’s performance (Weigast & Morgan, 1983, 
Weigast, 1984, McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984 cited in Nistotskaya, 2007:2). Whereas the 
accountability of the principal is not clear that may result in maximizing the profits and 
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opportunity for self-enrichment. Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2010) opine that if a 
principal is also corrupt, and no actors are willing to monitor and punish corrupt behaviour, 
the use of the principal-agent framework becomes useless. In that case, what can be done? To 
reduce the level of self-enrichment opportunities among principals, one can apply the same 
control mechanisms as towards the agents like discretion, limit the monopoly, and increase 
the level of accountability in the system by introducing internal auditing of checks and 
balances (Klitgaard, 1988 cited in Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2010:8 ) that is mentioned 
earlier in this section.  
 
The extensive literature review illustrates that [high] quality of government matters to curb 
corruption, and impartiality of civil servants/bureaucrat is a crucial element in it.Impartial 
behaviour especially among bureaucrats/civil servants should go as a built-in mindset once 
they are recruited in the public sector and they should not see it as an opportunity or an asset 
that can be misused for self and family/clan interests. Rather it is expected that policies 
should impartially be implemented in accordance with given legal framework. However, it is 
important to strengthen both the legal framework and bureaucratic mechanisms in order to 
make civil servants accountable and not to step outside of code of ethics.  
 
2.3 What bureaucratic mechanisms to study? 
Having backed up with sufficient and solid background and inspired by Dahlström, Lapuente 
and Teorell’s (2011) work, the paper will explore and test further what particular bureaucratic 
elements [may] deter the level of corruption and through which mechanisms it can be seen 
(Table 1).    
 
Table 1. Bureaucratic Features and its Mechanisms 
1. Professional Bureaucrats
Competence is required to select the 
qualified candidates.  
2. Well-paid bureaucracy
To get paid well in order not to 
complement the income by corrupt 
behaviour
3. (Internal) auditing mechanism Monitoring of checks and balances  
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First is the selection of candidates based on their competence. In order to perform well and 
deter the level of corruption it is believed to select the most competent ones. It is usually done 
through CV screening to choose potential candidates and conduct competence based 
interview afterwards. The latter is very common and widely practiced in many countries in 
comparison with competence based entry level exam. The concept of competence based 
recruitment in general allows choosing best candidates, however one can track some 
limitation if the screening is done publicly i.e. based on actual merits and competence of a 
candidate or on the contrary with consideration of connections or loyalty to political 
superiors.  
Second, the wage policy or competitive salary is a necessary component that would 
strengthen impartiality of civil servants. The economic literature assumes that reforming civil 
service with adequate form of remuneration is a prerequisite for public officials (civil 
servant) not to be tempted to get involved in corrupt behaviour.  Ackerman argues that if 
public sector is not a financially attractive place comparing to other sectors of economy, only 
those “willing to accept bribes will be attracted to the public sector, while others work in the 
private sector or just emigrate” (1999:47). Therefore, one of the reasons to keep the 
competent public employees incentivized and not let public servants be engaged in corrupt 
behavior is to increase or make equivalent to private sector wage and set up an adequate 
remuneration package. 
And finally, it is a necessary prerequisite to introduce a monitoring device to audit for checks 
and balance that may enable civil servants not to step out of codes of conduct. Following the 
above logic, Ackerman opines that for reforming of civil service, “the increase of salary is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient component” (1999:47). It, indeed, reduces the level of 
inducement, however, not to the absolute zero level. Because, once public officials begin to 
take bribes, there is no guarantee that by introducing a wide range of policies to incentivise 
public officials, corrupt behavior will be totally eradicated. In that case, as a parallel action, 
some penalties or internal check and balances are worth of being introduced. One of the 
methods of internal monitoring, suggested by Ackerman might be a probability of detection 
and punishment and the level of punishment should be designed in a way, where the expected 
penalty increases, as the level of inducement is increased. In that case, the law should be 
equally applied and (legal and administrative) penalties should be imposed to both bribe-
givers and bribe-takers, compelling both sides pay a multiple gain from the bribery (ibid: 48). 
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In many cases, an anti corruption measure includes penalties for bribe-takers leaving aside 
those who actually induced.   
Another method, suggested by the author (Ackerman, 1999) is the involvement of an 
independent and outside institution staffed with impartial individuals, being accountable to 
and representing the interest of the civil society, to complement the internal monitoring 
system and publish any occurred wrongdoings of checks and balances in mass media.  
Having this logic to follow, the empirical analysis will identify if such bureaucratic 
mechanisms are in place, and to what extent they are being established and implemented 
within ongoing public administration reform.  
3. Research Design: Aim, Methodology and Limitations  
3.1 Aim of the Research  
 
This section will give an overall description of the research methodology and introduce the 
aim of the research. Further, it will give a brief overview of the selected agencies and 
discusses the rationale of the selection of interviewees. Finally, the section describes the 
process of the field research and touches upon the delimitations that occurred during the field 
work. 
 
The research represents an attempt to empirically and comparatively analyse the effectiveness 
of bureaucratic features and its impact on the level of corruption in the public sector. The 
research will look at Tajikistan, a country in Central Asia, as a case study, where corruption 
has become wide spread both systemic and at individual level, thus affecting negatively the 
pillars of the quality of government. To tackle the corruption and its consequences, the 
Government of Tajikistan has been undertaking a number of institutional reforms for the last 
five years to bring transparency, integrity and efficiency both in the public and private 
sectors. Among those efforts is the public administration reform that aims to establish an 
effective public administrative system that will strengthen professionalism of the bureaucrats. 
The public administration reform is concerned with the entire public sector for the period of 
2005-2015 and is mandatory by legislation for the entire public sector. The reform comprises 
two types of components which can be labelled as “sectoral” – those that are dealt with 
specific agencies and “general” – that is applied by all public sector agencies. Among those 
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“general” components is the introduction of merit based recruitment (or competitive 
recruitment) as a prerequisite for a civil servant to enter a public agency.  
 
The aim of the research is not to build a hypothesis but rather to analyse in-depth if there is 
any causal mechanism between PA features and the level of corruption by answering the 
following research questions: 
 
- What merits does the reform bring for the meritocratic recruitment? 
- Does merit based recruitment have effect on level of corruption in the public sector? 
  
Furthermore the research will attempt to study a relative difference in PAR implementation 
and perception and attitudes of representatives of the sampling agencies, donor community 
and NGOs pertaining to meritocracy and corruption.  
 
The research is based on primary resources i.e. illustrating the answers of respondents, and 
secondary resources in order to obtain necessary background information from reports, 
articles and extract from newspapers.  
 
Thus to measure both positive and negative effects of the PA reform and to have a 
comparative analysis, the research is aimed to look at two ministries -Ministry of Education 
(MoE) and Ministry of Finance (MoF), the central bodies, over the period of 2007 and 2010
7
.  
According to the data provided by the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), corrupt activities are 
more pervasive in the MoE with 16 in 2007 and 67 revealed cases 2010 in comparison with 
the MoF with no case in 2007 and only one case in 2010 accordingly. Therefore, the rationale 
for opting for these ministries is to illustrate the effects of the reform and to identify the 
factors that may impede an effective and successful implementation of the reform. Moreover, 
the key “general” components of the PAR have been piloted in these ministries that might 
have an indirect effect on the whole process of reforming.  
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Initially it was planned to cover 2005-2010 to capture any significant changes in civil servant system and track the 
corruption variation in the sampling agencies over this period. Since the data on corruption is collected from Anti-Corruption 
Agency, it turned out that the data are available only since 2007, as the Agency was established on January 10, 2007. 
Therefore, the time period has been changed to 2007-2010.    
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3.2 Brief Overview of the Sample Agencies   
Before moving on to the main part of the field study, it is reasonable to introduce the sample 
agencies in brief - Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance with their organisational 
structures. This section will also give a brief intro of Anti-Corruption Agency and 
Department for Civil Service under President’s Office (and Institute for Civil Service 
Training) profile, as these agencies have  direct impact on competency and professionalism of 
civil servants and (revealed) corruption cases accordingly.  
 
According to the ADB Governance Report (2004:16) public service employs approximately 
300,000 employees, where education sector makes up a sizeable proportion of employment 
accommodating about 165.000 employees. The civil servants
8
 represent less than 10% of the 
public service, where they provide overall management of the public service.   
 
Ministry of Education is a central body which comprises 15 subordinate organisations, local 
education departments and Division of State Directorate for Education Control (DSDEC). 
However, only central ministerial staff and DSDEC are considered to be civil servants 
(overall number of civil servants is 138), while the rest are public servants providing 
education services.  
 
The MoE is responsible for developing and implementing policies on education, including 
standards and norms, setting plans and procedures for all educational institutions in the 
country (UNESCO, 2010:3-5). It also has a key role to monitor the execution of all education 
related policies and programmes. It is headed by the Ministry since 2005, and is assisted by 
the first deputy minister and two deputy ministers. Ministry of Education cooperates with 
education departments at the region and district levels which in their turn are responsible for 
pedagogical improvement and inspection of educational institutions at region and district 
levels (UNESCO, 2010).  
 
According to the Anti-Corruption Agency, MoE is considered as one of the most corrupt 
public agencies in 2010. The tendency is observed among public servants being engaged in 
                                                          
8
  For consistency, the current paper uses the term “civil servant” as a public bureaucracy i.e. a person employed in a 
governmental structure (for example, at the ministry or state agency level) and has a managerial authority, while a “public 
servant” is a public service provider (for example, teachers, doctors etc).  
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corrupt behaviour while providing education services, and effecting negatively on the entire 
image of the Ministry of Education
9
 .  
 
Likewise the MoE organisation structure, the central apparatus of the Ministry of Finance 
comprises 8 finance bodies. However the employees of 3
10
 out of 8 bodies, and the central 
apparatus itself are considered to be civil servants that accommodate 232 employees. The 
employees of the local branches in regions and districts are public servants or finance 
executive bodies.  The MoF is a central finance public agency responsible for budget 
planning and development, projections and allocations of funds for all public agencies.  
MoF, in one way, is implementing other components of PAR reform which is related to the 
public finance management and medium term expenditure framework
11
 (MTEF) to enable 
each ministry to be responsible for planning and development of budgets at all levels of their 
respective areas. In other way, the central body of MoF is a part of a piloting process, where a 
common wage rate distribution is piloted since 2010. The logic behind is that a starting point 
of the salary is multiplied by coefficient (steps or grades) and plus employment years.  It is 
opined that upon successful piloting, the common wage rate distribution will cover all public 
agencies; however, meanwhile the salary of the MoF is higher among other public agencies.  
It is reasonable to mention two other agencies/institutions that have direct impact on 
implementation of PAR and civil servants’ competency and professionalism and level of 
                                                          
9
   The occurrence is mostly seen during the enrolment to the higher education institutions, and it is quite common to get 
enrolled to the universities by bribing the representatives of the Ministry of Education. According to the Head of Anti-
Corruption Agency, the bribing mechanism is quite complex going through third and fourth hands, and the MoE is aware of 
the phenomenon. At the same time, MoE has acknowledged the existence of corruption in the higher education institutions 
[though indicating that such a thing] should not be a cause for bright and smart students to get enrolled. [in other words, do 
not need to pay a bribe in order to get enrolled]. (www.ozodi.org)  
10
 They are as following: 1. State Assay Inspectorate, 2. State Safe Vault, and 3. State Insurance Inspectorate   
11
 The MTEF is a three year fiscal policy programme which determines main economic parameters and the fiscal 
environment for the budget over the next three years. The primary objective of the MTEF is to facili tate 
medium-term policy-based budgeting. A c l a s s i c  M T E F  d i v i d e s  t h e  b u d g e t  i n t o  s e c t o r s ,  l i k e  
h e a l t h  a n d  e d u c a t i o n ,  b a s e d  o n  i n t e r - sectoral strategic priorities. The sectors themselves draw up 
medium-term sector expenditure plans linking expenditures to their policy objective over a three-year 
period. As the three-year period moves along, expenditures in each year inform the planning for the 
next year and the projections for the following years. The Ministry of Finance gives the sectors 
medium-term sector ceilings, determined by overall budget resource constraints and the government’s 
inter-sectoral expenditure priorities. The sectors then prioritise their expenditures to maximise the 
achievement of their objectives within the hard budget constraint of their expenditure ceilings 
(extracted from UNESCO and Japan Trust Fund report on MTEF, 2010:12).  
http://www.scribd.com/doc/52645395/Education-Financial-Planning-in-Asia-Implementing-Medium-term-Expenditure-
Frameworks-Tajik-is-Tan 
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corruption (occurrence of corruption cases). These agencies are not a part of the sample 
agencies, but are complementary part of the research design. 
Department for Civil Service under President’s Office (and Institute for Civil Service 
Training), established in 2001, is a central institution that is responsible for overall 
implementation of the law “on civil service”. The department also supervises the 
implementation of PAR components, and monitors the execution of meritocratic/competitive 
recruitment in the public agencies. It has a pivotal role in participating during the interview 
process in any of public agency and giving recommendations to the interview panel. The 
Institute for Civil Service Training is in charge of training and re-training opportunities for 
civil servants. The OECD Anti-Corruption Report (2010) acknowledges some positive 
dynamic in Institute’s performance stating that “the Institute has the capacity to launch a 
series of educational, methodological and research projects in the area of civil service”. Since 
2007, the Institute has a training curriculum for civil servants that include a course related to 
corruption prevention. 
Anti-Corruption Agency is an independent specialised anti-corruption institution established 
in 2007, directly reports to the President of the Republic of Tajikistan (RT) and is assigned to 
detect any corruption related cases both in public and private sectors in the country.  Despite 
a low comparability over time, it discloses corrupt cases categorised as fraud, bribes, misuse 
of public funds etc. in public and private agencies and brings these cases for further 
investigation, if necessary.  
3.3 Research Methodology. Field Work Process  
 The nature of the research is qualitative with a case comparison analysis. The main goal is to 
observe the effect of public administration reform and to find a causal mechanism between 
bureaucratic features defined as meritocratic recruitment and the level of corruption. The idea 
of the case comparative analysis is to give an in-depth understanding of differences or 
similarities between old and newly introduced public administration system and illustrate 
what outcomes the ministries achieved insofar. Therefore the analysis is two-fold: to compare 
over time i.e. between 2007 and 2010 and between public agencies i.e. Ministry of Education 
and Ministry of Finance.  
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Given the nature of the research that compares corruption level between two public agencies, 
the study will use data provided by Anti-Corruption Agency. The rationale and main 
argument to rely on ACA data is that data  on corruption by leading corruption measurement 
institutions such as Transparency International, ICRG, WGI, Freedom House etc. reflect the 
perceptions of the “target” audience not the actual situation and do not show the variations 
between public agencies, towns, districts and regions at national level. In addition, they 
represent the aggregated measure at national level and do not break down by (most affected) 
public/private sectors and type of corruption. Finally, half of the sources are either purely 
business oriented sampling or a mixture of public/private orientation. Thus having all these 
arguments as a basis, the research relies on data provided by the Anti-Corruption Agency for 
2007 and 2010. 
 
The field research was carried out in March 23 - April 8, 2011 and covered 21 respondents 
from MoE and MoF, Agency of State Financial Control and Fight against Corruption (or 
Anti-Corruption Agency), Institute of In-service Training under President’s Office and 
representatives of the donor community and local NGOs. In order to validate the answers and 
have a comprehensive qualitative analysis, the research attracted different actors and 
therefore divided [respondents] them into three groups i.e. reform makers (Department for 
Service Affairs under President’s Office and donors), reform implementers (sample 
ministries) and independent observers (representatives of NGOs).  
Among the donor community and international and local organisations only few are focusing 
on issues of accountability, integrity, transparency and good governance. These include 
“Reforming Public Sector” by the World Bank “State Enhancement and Improved 
Governance” by UNDP, “Support to the Civil Service Reform” by the EU and “Anti-
Corruption Education and Propaganda” by Republican Public Organisation. WB and EU 
were the main actors that support and administer the process of reform where the former 
focuses on the overall implementation and introducing public sector components, including 
wage rates distribution, meritocratic recruitment etc., while the latter provided its support to 
the Department for Service Affairs under President’s Office in strengthening its capacity to 
implement the Law “On civil service”.   
Considering that corruption is a sensitive issue especially in the public sector one can hardly 
get sufficient information from respondents about this phenomenon. During the field work it 
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was quite often to hear a standard response for example “corrupt behaviour is not practised in 
our ministry” or “our civil servants act in accordance with the impartiality principle” among 
sample public agencies staff. Despite the respondents expressed their willingness to 
participate in the research they were cautious about questions about corruption stating as non 
disclosure of internal and confidential information. Therefore the sub-questions on corruption 
were rephrased during the interview and supplementary follow up questions were asked.  
It shall also be mentioned that during interviews the tape recorder has not been used since the 
intention was to get sufficient information and 1) the consent to participate in the interview 
would be a challenge among respondents of sample agencies, 2) the respondents would not 
provide essential information and instead one would get a standard set of information.  
 
Only two public agencies, Ministry of Education and Anti-Corruption Agency requested   
both an official letter asking to meet with their respective staff members or provide relevant 
statistical data and a supporting document confirming that the research is a part of the thesis 
work and has some kind of external support by the institution. Other respondents were chosen 
strategically on the basis of their current job position either senior level of mid level 
professionals or via personal contacts. However years of working experience in the public 
sector was a general requirement.  
 
Number of employees being interviewed per agency is at least one and no more than four 
depending on the scope of activity of the organisation and availability of employees. 
However for two sample agencies (Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance) the 
selection of the respondents were based on three categories: 1) civil servants with about 10 
years of experience, 2) civil servants with no less than 5 years of working experience, and 3) 
from human resource department to get the idea about recruitment and remuneration policy 
and process. 
 
Last but not least, the research questions were initially developed in English. They were 
translated into Russian afterwards as most respondents especially in the public sector did not 
possess working knowledge of English. One questionnaire
12
 was designed and divided into 
sub-questionnaires as per institution’s profile to collect perceptions about the civil service 
                                                          
12
  Quality of Government Institute (www.qog.pol.gu.se/) conducted researches related to this topic in previous years, 
therefore the current paper utilizes some of the relevant to this area questions in this research.  
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system, recruitment process, and corruption perception. The total number of questions is 26 
and covered issues such as recruitment process, salary scale, employee qualifications, and  
civil servant system and corruption level in the public sector (Annex 2). Considering the 
sensitivity of the issue that research look upon an unwillingness of some respondents to 
mention their names, full anonymity of all respondents is maintained.  
 
3.4 Research Limitation 
Initially it was planned to have four ministries as the sample agencies that would illustrate 
both positive and negative ways of reform implementation and its effect on corruption. Since 
the approach of reforming is almost the same in the public sector, the research experienced 
difficulties in finding the most suitable ones to this study. As a result it had narrowed down to 
two public agencies; however it still meets the initial requirement and captures the elements 
of positive and negative side of reform implementation.    
Originally, it was planned to capture 2005 and 2010 time period in order to compare and 
observe the impact of the reform on corruption. However, it was learned that public 
administration reform was adopted in 2007 and data for corruption is available also since 
2007 as the agency was set up earlier that year. In spite of the research examining the impact 
of variables within three years, instead of initial five, the study does not shed its significance.  
Another limitation of the research is that it does not have the quantitative element as the 
scope of the sampling does not allow it. Consequently, the research does not measure or 
control other variables, such as GDP, human development index, type of regime etc., as it 
will require a study of bigger scale. Although the latter variable is vaguely touched upon in 
this study.   
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4. Introduction to the Case Study 
 4.1 Case Selection  
 
This section gives the overview of Tajikistan country context by building the ground for 
corruption and public administration system in the country.  
 
Tajikistan with over 7.6 million population is located in the Central Asian region bordering 
Afghanistan, China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
Tajikistan became an independent country in 1991 and shortly it has been plagued by internal 
conflict and political instability during 1992-1997. The consequences of the civil war and 
traditional economic and institutional structures inherited from the Soviet system affected 
greatly the economic development.  It is still the least developed country in Central Asia with 
GDP per capita of US$570 or 2545.3 TJK. Average monthly salary is 287 TJK (~$64.27) and 
around 47.2% of the population lives on or below the poverty rate (State Statistical Agency, 
www.stat.tj; WB Information Brief www.worldbank.org). 
Tajikistan is a presidential republic and according to the Constitution, the President is both a 
head of the state and government. The president is in power since 1994 and was re-elected for 
7 years in 2006 as per adoption of amendments in the current Constitution. The People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) led by President is a major political party
13
 in the country that has 
won 70.6% votes during the last elections in 2010 (OSCE, Parliamentary Elections report, 
2010).  
Low level of living standards, political preference, poor delivery of social services and 
inherited post-soviet bureaucracy led to the increase of corruption level in the country. 
Although fight against corruption is a high priority in Tajikistan and anti-corruption measures 
are included in various national programmes by the government, it is yet a pervasive 
phenomenon infecting almost every sector in the country (OECD, 2010:4).  For instance, the 
findings of a very recent public opinion survey by UNDP (2010) on corruption in Tajikistan 
revealed quite an obvious but alarming picture. Almost half of the respondents (49.6%) 
                                                          
13
  Tajikistan has a multi-party system with 8 registered political parties. As the OSCE report notes “the ruling PDPT 
holds a near monopoly not only on political appointments, but also on a administrative posts at the national, regional 
and local level”  (http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/69061, p.6). Other parties gained the following percentage of 
votes: 1. Islamic Renaissance Party – 8.2%; 2. Communist Party – 7.0; 3. Party of Economic Reforms -5.3%; 4. Agrarian 
Party – 5.1%; 5. Democratic Party – 1.0%, 6. Social Democratic Party – 0.8%, and 7. Socialist Party – 0.5 %.   
 believe that the majority of officials come to power only for their own self
means they tend to take bribes, while 14% of respondents opined that “civil servants extorts 
bribes from people  because they have to do it for people” (
UNDP, 2010:20-63).  
Statistical data for 2010 provided by the anti
corruption in the public sector. The top five public agencies
crimes were committed are:  Ministry of Education with its 67 cases, Ministry of Energy and 
Industry – 37 corrupt behaviour, Ministry of Health with
28, and Ministry of Transport with its 22 
press-release for 2010).  
Figure 1. Corruption Trend
(Data are generated from Anti-Corruption Agency, 2011
 
The pervasiveness of corruption in the country definitely effects negatively on the world 
ranking. Thus in Transparency International
thirty being positioned in 150 out of 180 countries worldwide (
                                                          
14
  Transparency International scoring system is based on a scale of  1 to 10, representing 1 the lowest  and 10 the 
highest level of corruption perception score (
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Table 2. Corruption Perception Ranking 
Place Ranking Place Ranking Place Ranking Place Ranking
TI CPI 150 2.1 151 2 158 2 154 2.1
2007 2008 2009 2010
 
(Source: www.transparency.org)  
The law on corruption was adopted in 2005 and is very generic and descriptive in nature, 
where it lacks a proper mechanism for implementation.  Supposedly, to make the law 
workable, the anti-corruption strategy was adopted in 2008 and prior to having a full-fledged 
framework, the corruption component was scattered in various national programmes mostly 
focusing on increasing the capacity to fight against corruption, transparency and 
accountability in the public sector. Since the adoption of the strategy, almost all state and 
local authorities have elaborated anti-corruption programmes. However, the 
comprehensiveness and efficiency of these measurement programmes to tackle corruption-
related activities are yet difficult to assess (OECD, 2010). For example, during the research 
interview no example of such document was provided, despite all interviewee participants 
among sample agencies mentioned about anti-corruption programme in their respective 
ministries.  
Nevertheless, to make these normative documents feasible, Anti-Corruption Agency was 
established in 2007 following the recommendations of the OECD anti-corruption network, 
where Tajikistan is a part of it. As mentioned in previous section, the anti-corruption agency 
has a very broad mandate; it focuses more on its full capacity in the field of investigations 
both in the public and private sector.  
Probably, one of the recent corruption scandals revealed in mid 2010 is around the son of the 
former Prosecutor-General who was charged against a bribe-taking incident involving 20,000 
USD while serving as a chief prosecutor in one of the district. Upon thorough investigation 
he was involved in at least 13
15
 cases related to corruption, such as bribing, misuse of 
authority etc.  Despite the head of the anti-corruption agency in his press-conference made an 
official statement
16
 that no high level official has the right to appoint his/her family members 
                                                          
15
  Available on: http://news.tj/en/news/investigation-case-son-former-tajik-chief-prosecutor-under-way  
16
  The statement is available in Tajik language at Radio Free Europe: http://www.ozodi.org/content/article/2114774.html - in Tajik 
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or close relatives in the public sector posts, the Law “On civil service” does not clearly 
indicate this point. This situation indicates that nepotism is one of corruption causes and is 
being practiced in the public sector that makes civil service to suffer. As argued by Hollyer 
(2009:3) nepotism and patronage require that posts are given to those who are able to “pay” 
for their position. The more such constraints occur excluding high skilled candidates to 
compete based on their merits, the more costly would be a patronage/nepotism system, and 
the less likely the use of merit based recruitment (ibid, 2009:3).    
The occurrence of such situation can be explained that countries in transit, like Tajikistan 
experience less impartiality from government bodies. It is probably because of the move from 
planned to market economy, design of new political institutions and that all together created 
the ground for corruption. On the other hand, the legislative part is narrow and somehow it 
lacks the concept of impartiality, professionalism and competence in the code of ethics.  
Despite the occurrence of such situation, the need for  the institutional reform, especially in 
the public administration arose in early 2000 where the major problems of public 
management and administration were reflected in Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper stating 
that “poverty reduction requires better management and more effectively and efficiently 
operating institutions both in state and private sector” (PRSP, 2002:13). The main stress was 
given to realign the functions of ministries/public agencies and to create a skilled, adequately 
paid and corruption free civil service capable of developing, implementing and monitoring 
government policies. ADB Country Governance Report (2004) indicates that the governance 
transformation is yet incomplete. There are vested interests that are resistant to change, 
therefore creating the challenges for developing effective institutional structures with 
effective management system.  
 
Nevertheless, much attention and actions taken were only during the last five years with 
adoption of Public Administration Reform that somehow is in line with current socio-
economic needs. While not all elements of the reform implemented in full capacity, yet some 
progress can be traced. The Law “On civil service” provides the ground for competitive 
recruitment to fill vacant position (-s) in the public sector, thus giving rise to a transparent 
and unbiased conduct of competitions and recruitment of the qualified and competent 
candidates. One of the core stages of the recruitment process is an interview, though it lacks 
competence based test that is considered to be as an inseparable part of a competition on 
filling vacant administrative positions in the public sector. Another development can be 
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referred to the remuneration/or wage scale that provides the increase in salary as per 
qualifications and working experience. However, the wage scale in its pilot phase, covering 
only selected agencies among of them is Ministry of Finance.  The thorough discussion of the 
reform implementation and its effect on corruption will be given in the next section.  
 
Having a brief overview of the current situation in the country with respect to corruption 
pervasiveness and steps undertaken to improve the situation in the public sector, the next 
section will discuss the implementation of the reform components and what factors impede  
[successful] implementation by providing and analysing the responses of the interviewees.  
 
5. Empirical Findings  
 
This section provides a thorough analysis of the field work. Given the nature of the research 
which is two-fold that compares public administration system over time and between sample 
agencies (i.e. ministries) - the paper first identifies significant changes that occurred in the 
recruitment process of the civil servant system. Further, the study separately looks at 
components of current civil servant system, and will try to trace the comparison between 
sample ministries. Upon each component, the section will attempt to analyse what problems 
may cause corruption and if there is any causal mechanism between bureaucratic features and 
level of corruption.  
 
5.1 Civil Service System – Before and After. Are there any significant 
changes for real? 
As noted above, the need to reform the civil service system raised in early 2000 where the 
transition process entailed socio-economic changes. At this point, the international 
community raised their concern on developing a solid platform for management of public 
affairs. Particularly, ADB Country Governance Report (2004:18) stressed that civil service 
must be free of partisan interests and ought to be structured based on competency and 
integrity. However, the move from a patronage based system to competency one seems to be 
wrenching, and the Government is cautiously approaching these changes. Nevertheless, the 
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Government recognized the need to professionalise public administration, by starting with the 
civil service system.     
 
Until 2001, there was no government institution that would deal with civil service and 
monitor the human resources status in the civil service system. Therefore, one of the reasons 
to establish the Department for Civil Service was to have a capacity to develop and 
implement the law on civil service that would fill in the gaps of previous civil service law 
adopted in 1998 and to create an effective public administration structure with a clear role 
and functions of employees. As a result, the new Law “On civil service” was adopted in 2007 
and since it was amended twice in 2010.  Moreover, the PAR Strategy for 2005-2015 was 
developed, where the main stress was given to improve the prestige of civil service at the 
labour market. The core problem which is seen in the strategy is that competitive 
(meritocratic) recruitment, staff assessment and overall human resource management is 
lacking.  Besides, one can observe the lack of motivation (both material and non-material), 
insufficient of incentives aimed at increasing the effectiveness among civil servants.  
 
The World Bank and EU were the major actors at central level that assisted the Government 
to improve its institutional capacity. In order not to overlap with activities, the EU focus was 
on strengthening the capacity of the Department for Civil Service, especially in drafting the 
law, while the WB input was on piloting and implementation of reform components, 
including meritocratic recruitment and pay reform.  
 
Despite adopting the Civil Service Law in 2007, one could not expect its immediate 
implementation due to the lack capacity and overall understanding of the concept and its new 
approaches. Therefore, the approaches of the old system were applied yet commonly by all 
public agencies in 2007.  The Table 3 generates opinion of respondents, not in a sequential 
order, with regard to different approaches that were either formally or informally applied 
during recruitment process.  
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Table 3. Comparison of Recruitment Approaches 
Before/in 2007 After /in 2010
Decentralised recruitment Centralised recruitment
Announced internally Externally. Through mass media 
A generic job description Detailed job description 
Several stage of separate interview One round of interview w.interview panel 
Relevance of competency is not a priority Competency is required 
 
When asking the very first question about the difference between the “old” and “new” 
approaches of the recruitment process from the group of “reform makers” and “sampling 
agencies”, the respondents named several of them. For instance, the following response was 
opined: 
 
“The recruitment was quite decentralised i.e. each ministry was assigned to  
recruit new staff. In other words, after graduation from universities, a new/young  
specialist was placed per public agencies/ministries. Now it is centralised,  
where the Department for Civil Service under the President’s Office monitors  
the entire recruitment process”. 
  View of respondents among “Reform-Makers” and “Sample Agencies” 
 
The placement system of the young/new specialists in the public institutions upon graduation 
was inherited from the Soviet system. Despite this approach not being of wide use after the 
collapse of the system, the ministry, especially Education, was practising it due to the lack of 
competent young specialists both at the central and local levels. Although the placement 
system is not widely exercised anymore in both ministries; the respondents admitted that 1 to 
3 new graduates are placed annually through this approach.  At the same time, 
decentralisation type of recruitment was associated with internal hiring, where only a small 
number of people were aware of any vacancies available within two ministries.  The only 
way that information of any available vacancy could reach the potential candidates was 
through the internal newspaper that is circulated within the ministry and its subordinate 
organisations. The announced vacancies only included the posts of junior positions (for 
instance, junior specialists), while senior position posts had internal promotion characteristic 
in many cases.  However, the information was not available for the majority of population, 
who had not access to the internal-type of newspaper. As respondents from both ministries 
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acknowledged many of the public officials/civil servants have been hired on the basis of 
personal and political contacts and it is yet preserved up to this date.  
 
 “The use of personal and other type of ties is an inevitable part of the hiring process”.  
     View of respondents among “Sample Agencies” 
 
This statement was the most repeated one by almost every respondent especially among 
independent observers. Most of them tend to believe that this feature was inherited from the 
Soviet system, but had been evolved deeper during the transition period, where the cronyism 
and clan played a significant role that was rather a normal way of hiring.  As noted by a 
respondent: 
 
 
“Each Ministry is a ‘clan’ with strong informal system of promotion or demotion  
based on personal relationships”. 
    View of a respondent among “independent observer” 
 
In terms of recruitment of new employees in both ministries, all respondents maintained that 
personal and political ties are very important during the hiring process. Unlike some EU 
countries, where personal and professional contacts matter to get a job, but based on 
meritocratic principles (EU report 2010 on QoG), in Tajikistan, such issues as cronyism, 
family affairs and personal contacts are pervasive almost at all levels that in many cases do 
not meet competence requirements.    
 
Another outstanding feature, mentioned by the respondents is that there was no centralised 
way of interview panel, where all short-listed candidates invited for an interview. Instead an 
applicant would go through several stages of separate (informal) interviews, starting from HR 
section, head of a concerned section and finally with a head of a concerned department. The 
absence of public and transparent way of admission process limited access to external 
candidates to be aware of any vacancies and apply for it accordingly. Since it was a 
decentralised and internal way of recruitment, the perception of population about public 
agencies, especially with regard to these ministries is that the public power is often used for 
self own interest. The root of the problem could be seen in the lack of accountability, 
transparency and interaction; therefore it created a gap in understanding clear roles and 
responsibilities of public sector employees. It is associated with bureaucracy that in turn is 
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perceived in a negative way which is predominantly related to opportunity for corrupt 
behaviour, such as bribing and misuse of funds.  
 
A generic job description is another prominent characteristic found in the old system. The 
respondents of both ministries acknowledged that very basic terms of reference (ToR) was 
used in previous years of recruitment with insufficient information about level and/or 
category of the announced position. It can probably be explained that the senior posts were 
technically filled in via internal promotion, while the posted vacancies were mainly targeted 
entry and junior to mid-level positions, hence a standard and generic terms of references was 
used.  
The terms of reference in both ministries did not have a thorough description of the tasks and 
responsibilities, including analytical ones. The overall stress was put on a good command of 
Tajik (native) and other languages (e.g. Russian and English), computer skills and relevant 
education background as the evidence that a candidate is capable to handle the work.  
 
Another notable characteristic identified by the respondents was about competency of the 
candidates. By “competency” the respondents referred to the work experience, a good 
command of native and other (foreign) languages, and computer skills. However, respondents 
differed in opinion. For instance, a respondent from ministry of education noted that work 
experience did not really matter, especially if a candidate was a recent graduate. This 
statement can be explained that pedagogical background is not a popular qualification among 
young people, and therefore an impression was that a candidate with minimum credentials 
could enter the ministry. This might entail another problem such as outflow of civil servants, 
especially among young specialists, as noted by another respondent, where they would not 
fulfil their expectations and low level of wage that is one of the main incentives force them to 
move to the private sector.  This was quite possible for MoE to conduct internal way of hiring 
process to fill in the existing human resources gap.  
 
At the same time, a respondent from ministry of finance had an opposite opinion stating that 
anyone with necessary skills had equal chances to get a job, however those without any 
personal and other type of contacts need to show more enthusiasm during the selection 
process. Due to the fact that economic background is very popular among young people and 
is considered as one of the prestigious qualifications to have, the labour market is 
overabundant by people with economic and finance management background.  
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The differences in hiring process captured in the comparison with Table 3 indicates that prior 
to adoption of the PAR reform - the recruitment was closed and barely based on meritocracy. 
The promotion of the staff seemed to happen internally, giving fewer opportunities for 
outside candidates to be aware of any possibilities. The only distinctive feature between 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance is that the former was lacking of competent 
people due to the nature of hiring process, lack of motivation among young specialists, and 
indeed lack of material and non-material incentives that would stimulate employees not to be 
engaged in any corrupt behaviour. While the latter is considered to be a prestigious public 
agency to work in, where a hiring process was on the basis of networking rather meritocracy, 
however, a relative competence could yet be observed.  
 
5.2 Reforming Civil Service System 
5.2.1 Recruitment Process 
 
The move from old type of system to the new one requires time and adaptation. Therefore 
elements of the previous approach are yet preserved in the ministries despite all efforts given 
to introduce new approaches of hiring process of civil servants.  
 
Nevertheless, having a solid legal ground, government commitment with technical and 
financial support from international donor organisations, the reform introduced new 
approaches of hiring process.  One of the novelties, as per reform makers, is an open and 
transparent selection process, where anyone with necessary skills and competence has equal 
opportunities to apply for a job in the public agencies. In accordance with the PA reform it 
was compulsory for all public agencies to advertise vacancy in the mass media and their 
respective websites. This approach has definitely played an important role to achieve the 
openness in the recruitment process, where any jobseekers among both internal and external 
candidates had an opportunity to compete equally in the selection process.  
 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance were among of first public agencies where 
open and public selection procedure was introduced. The representatives of the personnel 
department (hereafter referred to as HR) of both ministries underlined that according to the 
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adopted rules and regulations, any available administrative positions
17
  are subject to external 
announcement which is published in a public (designated) and internal newspaper
18
, and a 
vacancy advert is kept for 14 days. In average they usually receive 6-8 applications in the 
MoE and 10-12 applications in case of MoF per announced vacancy. Even though, all 
applicants are screened based on their merits and competences, they are all invited for the 
interview, including those who meets partial or minimum requirements. The representatives 
of both ministries explained this approach as “to give equal chances for every applicant to go 
through the next stage i.e. interview”. The chairman of the interview panel is the minister 
himself both in MoF and MoE; they have an authority to nominate the members of the 
interview panel, who are usually among heads of departments. A representative of the 
Department of Civil Service is also a member of the interview panel, and his/her presence 
considered to be obligatory, but many respondents during the interview stressed out that their 
representation has rather a nominal presence.   
 
A very interesting aspect of vacancy announcement was revealed in both ministries. The 
representatives of HR section admitted that to publish an advert in any of public and well-
known (popular) newspaper (-s) is costly and administrative costs are very scarce, which they 
cannot afford to publish every single vacant post in the public newspaper. Instead, once in a 
quarter, they compile all vacancies into one advert with a very generic term of references and 
highlight minimum qualifications that match all vacancies they post. Usually, under this 
category fall the vacancies for junior and mid level specialists with 2-3 years of experience. 
While, a position for a higher level is either promoted or announced internally.   
 
Hence, it seems that a hiring process is established and all administrative vacancies undergo 
via competitive and meritocratic recruitment. However, supplementary information with 
regard to the whole process was provided by the independent observers claiming for non-
transparency of hiring process. The announced positions are predominantly published in 
                                                          
17
  There are eight categories that falls under “administrative position” – one high category ((first) deputy minister(-s)) and seven categories ( 
for instance, first category is entitled for head of department and 7th category is entitled for junior specialist). Even though, the high category 
falls under administrative position, it does not go through open type of recruitment. The head of government appoints both first deputy 
ministry and deputy ministries.   
18
  Almost all public agencies have their internal newspaper, where the sector related news is shared within the agency and its subordinate 
organisations. The subscription for this newspaper is a must for all civil and public servants and it is circulated once a week or bi-weekly.  
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance has each their own internal newspaper, where the latest news related to their respective sector 
(discussions of programme and strategies/interviews/latest achievements) is published.   
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internal ministerial newspapers rather than in the public ones. Due to the lack of information, 
very few outside candidates may know what types of vacancies are available at the ministry. 
Even the information with regard to the vacancies is either empty or out of date on their 
official website. Besides, the observers were cautious about the way how the vacancy 
announcement is designed; even though one of the EU report recommendations (2007) was to 
have detailed description of duties along with job description and required competency in 
order the potential applicants can have an idea about types of available vacancies.   
 
Another novelty in the hiring process is a good command of native (Tajik) language which is 
an important requirement when a person applies for a position. A recent adopted law on 
language in 2009 makes mandatory to use Tajik in official communications, and especially in 
the public agencies eroding Russian that was widely used until that time in both public and 
private sectors. Although respondents opined that it is not mandatory to speak Tajik to get a 
job in the ministry, but it certainly represents an advantage since both official and daily 
communications is held in Tajik. In this sense, language becomes a barrier though not a 
formal one, but still to get a job. It especially concerns those who graduated Russian speaking 
schools/universities, where the education is believed to be a way better than in Tajik ones. 
Nevertheless, such informal obstacle narrows down the opportunity of competent people to 
compete in the selection process and it indeed creates an implicit preference towards Tajik 
language speakers.  
 
The overall impression of independent observers is sceptical on the whole process of reform 
implementation pointing out that recruitment process is technically impartial and transparent, 
however in fact, it is affected by patronage, relativism and personal and political relationship.  
 
“The announced vacancies are conducted in a nominal way to show up they follow  
the necessary procedures.  If young and talented Tajiks were allowed into the public 
administration it would be a great thing. It just does not happen unless it’s a case of  
nepotism or cronyism . Nepotism is firmly entrenched in the recruitment and it is the  
rule rather than the exception”.  
    View of a respondent among “Independent Observer” 
 
Almost all respondents, even among sample agencies acknowledged that relativism and 
cronyism is a common way to get employed and personal ties supersede the official way of 
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hiring process in the public sector. This especially concerns Ministry of Finance, as discussed 
in previous section, being one of the prestigious places to work in among other ministries, 
and therefore personal or political contacts often are given merits. A respondent confirmed 
that some vacancies are not even posted and employers replace the candidates via political 
contacts. For example, a head of a department who had the extensive work experience in the 
ministry was downgraded to a lower position as a leading specialist. Instead, he was replaced 
by a son of a political actor without any formal recruitment process.  
 
The independent observers critically opined that meritocratic or competitive recruitment, 
transparency and professionalism are lacking in the public sector. Cronyism and nepotism 
negatively affect the quality of civil service, as those who are more competent and capable 
always are left behind and have fewer opportunities to get a job.  
5.2.2 Career Development 
 
The tendency of career development is observed among mid-and high level civil servants, 
while the turnover is high among young specialists. As one of the respondent critically 
opined:  
 
“…young and perspective specialists do not pursue their civil servants’ career  
due to low level of salary, lack of social package benefits and lack of government’s  
responsibility to secure their future opportunities”.  
    View of a respondent among “Independent Observer” 
 
Career development first of all is motivated by material and non-material incentives. A very 
interesting observation was done by a MoE respondent. According to the statement, the 
departments in the ministry are categorised by “prestigious” and “non-prestigious”, where in 
the former, the employees are willing to get promoted and develop their skills. According to 
this logic, under “prestigious” classification fall the following departments such as, marketing 
and procurement department, international relations department, and finance/accountant 
department etc. It turns out that the interest for career development pretty much depends on 
the place you work in; if a formal material and non-material incentives are lacking, civil 
servants try to find the advantages out what they have. For instance, specialists in the 
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international relations department are motivated by meetings with international partners to 
strengthen their negotiation capacity and learn best practices in the area of education from 
their colleagues or get stimulated by study tour (out-of-country) travels as non-material 
incentives.  In contrast, the outflow of civil servants is seen in the “non-prestigious” 
department, where they could hardly meet their expectations and do not get motivated by 
dealing with just paper work.  
 
Another aspect of career development is internal promotion that occurs once a position is 
upgraded. Not all vacancies operate through open position system where external candidates 
can apply for it.  Once in three years the internal examination (or attestation) of the staff is 
conducted to assess their performance.  An evaluation committee is generally formed of 
heads of sections and departments, where they examine the qualifications and competency of 
staff. The attestation process can be equaled to the interview process, where the members of 
the committee examine the knowledge of regulatory and legal documents/aspects, language 
proficiency and computer skills. As the representatives of HR departments of both ministries 
opined, roughly 7-10% of employees do not get through the attestation/evaluation process 
that may result in losing their jobs. If an employee passes the attestation successfully, s/he 
will be upgraded in position that also effects on increase of salary. Besides, if a staff is 
overqualified and professional, s/he is nominated to the “cadre reserve system” of civil 
servants. So called “cadre reserve system” is aimed to provide a career development for 
qualified and professional specialists. The idea behind the “cadre reserve system” is that a 
pool of qualified specialists is identified and their personal history is kept in the Department 
for Civil Service.  Once any vacancies appear they either are placed automatically or 
nominated as an internal candidate to get through the next stage, in case there are few 
“reserve” candidates.  For example, Ministry of Education accommodated 4 candidates and 
Ministry of Finance 6 via reserve system in 2010 accordingly. An independent observer 
opined that the system is politicized, where the nomination of the candidates are done from 
current ruling party.  
 
5.2.3 Analysis of Causal Mechanism: Merits and Meritocracy   
 
The advantage of meritocracy, comprising a formal way of examination/interview, 
competency and professionalism is clear. By providing transparent benchmarks, it helps to 
-42- 
 
identify those who are knowledgeable and qualified for a position. Moreover, it facilitates 
competition among number of competent candidates, thus restricting the use of other 
mechanisms, such as patronage and relativism. Thus, the idea about meritocracy is that it 
helps to ensure that the civil service is staffed with capable and skilled individuals and it is 
thus relatively productive (Hollyer, J, 2009:10).  Many studies have pointed out the 
importance of selection of professional bureaucrats to government performance. For instance, 
the East Asian experience in 90-s of last decade became the arena for research, where 
findings were quite diverging. WB (1993) noted the competitive nature of the recruitment 
process, where meritocracy was given high priority and merit-based examination 
administered among students of prestigious universities of their respective countries. 
Studying this question, Geddes (1994) comes up with a different opinion, stating that political 
competition might lead to increased use of patronage, thus moving away from meritocracy 
 
The empirical findings illustrate that meritocratic recruitment is endorsed formally, but 
instead a majority of civil servants are hired and promoted on the basis of patronage and all 
types of contacts. The priority is given to networking and contacts instead of competency and 
professionalism and unfortunately meritocracy is hardly rewarded in the public sector. It does 
not mean that there is lack of competent people, but rather there is a misbalance of qualified 
specialists.  
Tajikistan like other countries in transition faces difficult tasks to create a professional civil 
service system; they have one advantage over many developing countries. They have a well 
educated population capable of performing the tasks of modern government. However, many 
people need retraining to be able to take on the new responsibilities required of civil servants 
in a market economy (Collins, 1993:335 cited in Rose-Ackerman, 1999:71).  
Despite the quality of education has been deteriorated in recent years, the level of education 
in the country is considerably high and it is quite common after (general) secondary 
education
19
  to pursue the postgraduate path. This feature has remained since the Soviet 
system.  According to the data provided by the Department for Civil Service about 30 000 
young specialists graduate the universities annually. For a country, like Tajikistan the number 
                                                          
19
  General education system in Tajikistan is three fold which consists of primary education (grades 1-4), secondary 
education ( grades 5-9) and upper secondary education (grades 10-11).  
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of new specialists is enough to get employed, however it turns out that qualified and 
competent young specialists are lacking. It is because, the labour market is overcrowded with 
the so called “prestigious” specialists, which are predominantly in the area of business 
administration and finance management such as: economists, managers, accountants etc.; 
while pedagogy and education management background is not qualified as prestigious and 
therefore competent and skilled professionals are lacking.  
The overabundance of specialists may entail a wide use of patronage and relativism to get a 
job in the public sector, especially among the so-called “prestigious” ministries. As Hollyer 
argues, patronage is characterized by skilled and unskilled candidates devoting their energies 
to the pursuit of private gain instead providing public service (2009:1). This may result in 
exclusion of skilled candidates from competition by such constraints, and therefore the more 
patronage system is in use, the less likely meritocratic recruitment will be practised (ibid: 3).  
 
5.3 Salary, Incentives and Pay 
Adequate financial remuneration plays an important role to incentivise public/civil servants 
to perform duties and responsibilities impartially and not to be engaged in corrupt behaviour. 
There is high wage disparity in the country, where the salary in the public sector is the lowest 
compared to the private sector and international organisations. According to the MoE source, 
the minimum wage scale in the ministry is 200 TJS (≈ 44 USD) and it has recently been 
increased by 10% in 2010. A pay system is grounded to the bureaucrat’s longevity in the 
ministry and his/her rank (or grade) (Nistotskaya, 2009:30-31). There are indeed incentives, 
such as bonus payment and long service bonus
20
 on top of salary that somehow stimulate 
public employees.  
As a part of the PAR reform, a common wage rate distribution (salary grid) is being piloted 
since later 2010 in five public agencies, where MoF is among them. The current salary of the 
MoF is higher by 30% according to this system. It is too early to say anything or measure its 
                                                          
20
   Long service bonus can be both material and non-material. For instance, as a non-material bonus, a civil servant may be 
awarded a rank an “Honoured Worker” for dedication and excellent work. However, this non-material award will be 
transferred to a material incentive which will affect to the increase of a pension for length of the service once an awarded 
civil servant goes to the retirement.   
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impact; however a gradual transition from current pay system is anticipated by joining other 
five ministries in late 2011. The difference between the current pay system and newly 
introduced one is that the salary grid varies as per budget allocation in public agencies within 
current system. In the newly introduced one, a civil service salary grid will link compensation 
to the level of responsibility, experience and complexity of civil servants’ work. In other 
words, a starting fixed salary is multiplied by the coefficient (steps and/or grades) and plus 
employment rate. For instance, the starting point of the salary is fixed – 350 TJS (≈77 USD) 
and will be increased per upgraded step by 5% (there are 14 steps) and per upgraded 
categories by 22% (there are 7 categories).   
As an ongoing process of the reform, a vertical functional review was carried out in 2010 in 
both ministries, where the proposition of each new central ministry apparatus and its 
subordinate agency structures were reviewed and submitted to President’s Executive Office. 
The idea about reorganisation of the ministry is to assess the impact of staffing levels and 
estimate the budget implications.  One of the recommendations that included in the review 
was to increase the salary for civil servants by reducing their overall number. This is, 
however, at the stage of discussion and consideration, however some of the respondents, 
especially at the MoE did not agree with such recommendations.  
5.3.1 Analysis of the Causal Mechanism: Salary 
 
The respondents were asked to assess effectiveness of measures intended to reduce corruption 
in the public sector. As anticipated, the most effective mean to reduce corruption is to 
increase their salaries. Low salaries seem to be an inducement for corrupt behaviour, and 
when civil servants are paid inadequately, many of them may consider it acceptable to take a 
bride (Mirzoev, 2006). The empirical findings and figures from Anti-Corruption Agency 
serve as an example, where the Ministry of Education is more prone to corruption. Given the 
fact the allocation for education
21
 is lower in comparison with other public sectors; the salary 
respectively is anticipated to be lower in education sector. This can probably serve as the 
main reason why corruption is unfortunately pervasive among public [education] service 
providers.   
 
                                                          
21
  GDP allocation for education is 3.8 and  a high proportion of the expenditures goes on personnel costs – about 77%. (MTEF report by UNESCO 
and Japan Trust Fund, 2010:10) http://www.scribd.com/doc/52645395/Education-Financial-Planning-in-Asia-Implementing-Medium-term-
Expenditure-Frameworks-Tajik-is-Tan    
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As Rose Ackerman argues that low salary and misuse of public/government position may be 
an inducement for corruption. With no civil service tenure secure, the civil servants who 
expect to lose their jobs may simply put money away for the future (Rose-Ackerman, 
1999:70). Simply saying for public employees the payoffs acceptance to supplement salary 
and second jobs are the survival strategy (ibid, 1999:72). Although, the study did not measure 
the types of survival strategy or impact of cultural aspect, most respondents
22
cautiously 
mentioned that running a small business apart from their main job is a permissible for them to 
support their families. By them, it is considered as a “forced” coping strategy rather than 
something wrong.  
5.4 Checks and Balances 
Out of all asked questions, corruption seemed to be a sensitive issue for respondents of 
sample agencies stating it as a non disclosure of internal and confidential information. The 
most frequent and general answer one could get from the sample agencies is that corruption 
behaviour is not practiced in the ministry, and civil servants act in accordance with 
impartiality norms and principles. Talking about corruption data by ACA was like a taboo, 
therefore one could expect no reaction from both ministries stating that they did not have any 
information or not responsible for this issue.  Although they admitted that in general it is 
pervasive in the public sector, thus changing the direction of the interview smoothly.  
 
The causation of corruption, according to the respondents is access to “easy money”, lack of 
financial incentives, and lack of proper checks and balances in the public agencies. A very 
critical note was done by an independent observer stating the following: 
 
 “Each Ministry has its own mechanisms for corruption but the root cause is 
 the same –there is no accountability or transparency in the operations of the  
Ministry and it is treated as a means of rent collection by civil servant in a  
vertical structure”. 
   View of a respondent among “Independent Observer” 
 
A very interesting observation was made by a respondent from sample agency claiming that, 
individuals and private sector provoke corruption in the public sector by bribing or presenting 
                                                          
22
  Almost all independent observers and couple of respondents from sample agencies admitted.    
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gifts in order to avoid “long-lasting” bureaucratic chain. The thing is Tajikistan is a culture 
oriented country, where giving gifts is very popular and considered as a common and normal 
feature – as a means to express gratitude. The assumption among public employees is that “to 
accept small gifts and inexpensive presents should be rather interpreted as acknowledgement 
of one’s power or showing respect and hospitality, which is one of the traditional features of 
the Tajik society” (Mirzoev, 2006:31).  
 
The corruption prevention mechanisms are multi-dimensional. As reported, public agencies 
elaborated anti-corruption programme. During the interview, no sample was provided and 
therefore it is difficult to say anything about the effectiveness of measures undertaken and 
what tools and mechanisms are to be used in deterring corruption.  Institute of Civil Service 
developed module training on issues related to corruption and its preventive anti-corruption 
aspect. A handbook on “Ethics and integrity in the civil service” that has the sections about 
ethics, regulation of conflict interest, and fighting with corruption was developed with the 
financial support of EC funded project and disseminated among public agencies. The Anti-
Corruption Agency established in 2007 is a responsible body to detect and disclose 
corruption related cases both in the public and private sectors. As reported by the anti-
corruption representative, they conduct two types of inspection: 1) “ad hoc” inspection once a 
year, that is a random department or section is chosen (for example, procurement, accounting 
etc) to investigate the checks and balances, and 2) a comprehensive inspection of the entire 
public agency. The level of punishment of a public/civil servant caught in any corrupt cases 
depends on the scale of corrupt actions and whether it is revealed internally or externally. As 
explained by the respondents of sampling agencies, if a civil servant is caught internally, the 
individual would either be dismissed or obliged to pay the fine. If the case is caught 
externally by anti-corruption agency, in many instances, the case is brought to the court. The 
non-disclosure of internal affairs can probably be explained that public agencies do not want 
the public to know and therefore, they try to settle the problem in a way they consider to be 
the best.  
5.4.1 Analysis of Causal Mechanism: Checks and Balances  
 
There is lack of information about anti-corruption programmes developed by ministries to see 
if any concrete measures are taken or any internal checks and balances conducted. The 
establishment of the Anti-Corruption Agency shows a nominal way of transparency in checks 
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and balances in the public sector. Almost all respondents were not satisfied with the work 
executed by the anti-corruption agency, questioning the impartiality of agency staff. At the 
same time, lack of professionalism and competency is observed in the agency. It is mentioned 
during the interview that the agency is lacking of impartiality behaviour by disclosing the 
corrupt behaviour only among street bureaucrats, while the pervasiveness of corruption is 
observed among high level officials. The credibility of the ACA is questionable. The 
respondents felt that the agency is not accountable to people, but rather acts on its own, where 
the issue of transparency is under a big question. They were doubtful whether the ACA is a 
right organisation being responsible for checks and balances. The following quotation 
represents the idea about this agency by, mostly, independent observers: 
“The State Agency on Corruption operates as the State Agency for Extortion  
especially of the private sector.  There is a very low rate of voluntary disclosure  
generated by detection of corruption in agencies” 
View of a respondent among “Independent Observer” 
This quotation is quite similar to the opinion of a recent Public Opinion Survey (2010) by 
SCC and UNDP that included the Agency in the list of the most corruptive state bodies 
(2010:28). The following is extracted from this survey report: 
[The purpose owing to which the Anti-corruption Agency was created have 
not been achieved. In our eyes it does not have any credibility, because they  
do not work and the results of their work are not visible. They did not ease  
our life, but only become rich. Only those who cannot pay off are punished] 
extracted from Public Opinion Survey by SCC and UNDP, 2010:21 
 
Besides ACA no other independent institution is involved in the internal monitoring system. 
The mass media provides ad hoc information collected mostly from the ACA or via 
independent investigation mainly among street bureaucrats. All this evidence indicates that 
the lack of proper monitoring mechanism entails the flourish of corruption in the public 
sector.  
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6. Conclusion  
 
This thesis has explored the issue of meritocracy and its effect on corruption by observing the 
causal mechanism both theoretically and empirically in the context of Tajikistan. Given the 
nature of the research which is two-fold that compares over time and between sample 
agencies, the paper attempted to look at previous and current civil service system and identify 
any significant changes that might have occurred in the recruitment process of the civil 
service system. One of the main shortfalls in the previous system encountered in the research 
is that the hiring and promotion and information about vacancies in the sample agencies were 
close and to large extent relativism and patronage was an inevitable part of the recruitment 
process. Relativism and all types of the contacts still preserved in the current system, 
however one of the significant changes that have occurred in the current system is the merit 
based (or competitive) recruitment.  
 
The empirical analysis revealed that meritocratic recruitment does not have an effect on the 
level of corruption at its earliest endorsement. However it is early to assess its overall impact, 
as it is being practiced for only 2-2,5 years and therefore some shortfalls and drawbacks can 
yet be observed. It is formally applied within the new PAR system, but instead a majority of 
civil servants are hired and promoted on the basis of patronage and all types of contacts. The 
priority is given to networking and contacts instead of competency and professionalism and 
unfortunately meritocracy is hardly rewarded in the public sector. Financial motivation and 
incentivisation of civil servants is not sufficient. Low salaries indeed serves as an inducement 
for corruption, and when the civil servants are paid inadequately, many considered it 
allowable for them to accept a bribe. There is a huge disparity in wage distribution between 
sample ministries that possible explains the high level of corruption in the MoE in recent 
years. It is too early to measure the impact of the new salary grid system, and there is no 
guarantee if the system will give a positive outcome.  
 
The data from the Anti-Corruption Agency showed that the Ministry of Education is more 
prone to corrupt behaviour compared to the Ministry of Finance. The low level corruption 
cases in the Ministry of Finance is not the indication of the positive case, but rather the 
overabundance of specialists result in wide use of patronage and all types of contacts in the 
Ministry of Finance to select “the better” candidates.  
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The root of the corruption causation can be traced in the poorly functioning institutions and 
policy implementation that undermine the competition based on competency in the public 
sector. On the one hand, the change from a command to market economy created the 
opportunities for inducement, which is considered the source for rent-seeking behaviour 
among bureaucrats (Mauro, 1995). On the other, a country in transition, Tajikistan, a wide 
range of institutional reforms have been introduced, where the capacity was lacking and the 
system of checks was not developed properly that entails the flourish of corruption in the 
public sector.  
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Appendix 1. Map of Tajikistan 
 
Capital: Dushanbe Total Area: 143,100 sq km GDP by sector: 19.2% agriculture, 
22.6%  industry, 58.1% services 
(2010 est.) 
Independence: September 9, 1991 Administrative Division: 4 regions Population below poverty line: 53% 
(2009 est.) 
Government type: Unitary, Semi-
Presidential Republic 
Major languages: Tajik, Russian Work force: 2.1 mln (2009); 
agriculture: 49.8%, industry: 12.8%; 
services 37.4% (2009 est.) 
President: Emomali Rahmon (1991-
ongoing) 
GDP (PPP): $14.74 billion (2010 est.) Exports: aluminium, electricity, 
cotton, fruits, vegetable oil, textiles 
Population7,627,200 (July 2011 est.) GDP  per capita (PPP): $2,000 (2010 est.)  
  
. 
(Sources:   http://www.state.gov; http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/tajikist.pdf ) 
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Appendix 2. Sample of Questions 
 
 
1 Selection Process in previous system and within new PA reform 
1.1 How do you fill vacant position in your ministry? Any 
changes/amendments in the recruitment process over the period? 
1.2 What is the approximate length of the hiring process and is there any 
formal way of an examination system?   
1.3 When recruiting public sector employees, are the skills and merits of the 
applicants taken into consideration to get a job? What are the minimum 
requirements? How many applications do you receive for a position? 
Roughly, tentatively? 
1.4 When recruiting public sector employees, do the 
political/personal/business connections of the applicants matter to get a 
job?  
1.5 Approximately what is the proportion of currently working employees 
who have entered the service via the competitive recruitment (formal 
examinations, interview) procedure? 
1.6 In your opinion, does meritocratic recruitment have a (positive) impact 
in your ministry?  
1.7 Are senior public officials recruited from within the ranks of the public 
sector? 
1.8 Once one is recruited as a public sector employee, does one stay a public 
sector employee for the rest of one’s career? What is the appr. 
percentage? What is the percentage of staff turnover? 
1.9  What is necessary for ensuring efficient competitive selection of 
personnel? 
2. Career Development 
2.1 How do you perceive the long-term stability of young employees and 
their interest in a career within your ministry? 
2.2 Are various types of contacts (personal/ business/ political) important 
when hiring new employees? Do you think it differs between the 
ministries/public agencies? 
2.3 What is the percentage of employees who have been hired on a 
political/personal/business contacts basis? 
3 Civil Service Training 
3.1 How often does a public sector employee have training and retraining 
opportunity? What is the duration of the training programme? 
3.2 Does each ministry have its own training and retraining programme that 
you work with or do you have a common programme for public 
agencies? 
3.3 In your opinion, when recruiting public sector employees, what occurs 
most - political/personal/business connections or qualifications of the 
applicants to get a job in the public sector?  
3.4 In general is the selection process in the public sector is competitive and 
free of bias, unlawful discrimination, nepotism or patronage? Is 
nepotism being practiced in the recruitment process in the public sector? 
3.5 In your opinion, do the qualifications of new/young specialists meet the 
needs of the public sector? Do you feel they are well prepared? 
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4. Salary/Incentives 
4.1 What is the salary scale in your ministry?  
4.2 Are salaries of public sector employees linked to appraisals of their 
performance? How often the performance of the staff is evaluated by 
supervisor?  
4.3 Are there any additional incentives to motivate new/young specialists? 
5. PA reform 
5.1 How do you assess the implementation of public administration reform? 
5.2 What are the major differences between the old and new civil servant 
system? Training programme? 
5.3 What are the main problems/challenges to effectively implement the 
public administration reform?   
6. Corruption 
6.1 What situations do civil servants face once they found corruption and 
fraud?  
6.2 Are corruption and fraud more prominent in the public or the private 
sector or is it about the same in both? 
6.3 In your opinion, what is the main cause of corruption in the public 
agency? 
 
